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Simultaneous Mode, Input and State Set-Valued Observers with
Applications to Resilient Estimation against Sparse Attacks
Mohammad Khajenejad Sze Zheng Yong
Abstract—A simultaneous mode, input and state set-valued
observer is proposed for hidden mode switched linear systems
with bounded-norm noise and unknown input signals. The
observer consists of two constituents: (i) a bank of mode-
matched observers and (ii) a mode estimator. Each mode-
matched observer recursively outputs the mode-matched sets
of compatible states and unknown inputs, while the mode
estimator eliminates incompatible modes, using a residual-based
criterion. Then, the estimated sets of states and unknown inputs
are the union of the mode-matched estimates over all com-
patible modes. Moreover, sufficient conditions to guarantee the
elimination of all false modes are provided and the effectiveness
of our approach is exhibited using an illustrative example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Potential vulnerability of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
to adversarial attacks and henceforth their security, are
emerging as an important and critical issue. Given that
attackers are often strategic, there are many potential avenues
through which they can cause harm, steal information/power,
etc. Recent incidents of attacks on CPS, e.g., the Maroochy
water system and Ukrainian power grid, [1], [2], highlight a
need for new resilient estimation and control designs.
In particular, an adversary’s ability to inject counterfeit
data into sensor and actuator signals (false data injection) or
to compromise an unknown subset of vulnerable sensors and
actuators (e.g., [3]–[9]) in order to mislead the system opera-
tor has been a subject of considerable interest in recent years.
This problem can be considered in a more general framework
of hidden mode switched linear systems with unknown inputs
and also has applications in urban transportation systems [6],
aircraft tracking and fault detection [10], etc.
Literature review. The filtering problem of hidden mode
systems without unknown inputs have been extensively
studied (see, e.g., [11], [12] and references therein). More
recently, an extension to consider unknown inputs has been
proposed in [6] for stochastic systems. However, these meth-
ods mainly focus on obtaining point estimates, i.e., the most
likely or best single estimates, and do not directly apply to
bounded-error models, i.e., uncertain dynamic systems with
set-valued uncertainties (e.g., bounded-norm noise), where
the sets of all modes, states and unknown inputs that are
compatible with sensor observations are desired.
On the other hand, set-membership or set-valued state
observers (e.g., [13]–[15]) are capable of estimating the set of
compatible states and are preferable to stochastic estimation
when hard accuracy bounds are important, e.g., to guarantee
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safety. Moreover, a recent extension to also compute the set
of unknown input signals in addition to the states has been
introduced in [16]. However, these approaches do not apply
to hidden mode systems that we consider in this paper.
In the context of resilient estimation against sparse false
data injection attacks, numerous approaches were proposed
(e.g., [3]–[9]), but they all only obtain point estimates,
as opposed to set-valued estimates. Moreover, only sensor
attacks have been considered, although actuator attacks are
also a source of concern in CPS security. On the other hand,
our prior work in [16], [17] design a fixed-order set-valued
observer that simultaneously outputs sets of compatible state
and input estimates despite data injection attacks for linear
time-invariant and linear parameter-varying systems, without
considering the hidden modes, i.e., with the assumption that
the subset of attacked sensors and actuators is known.
To consider hidden modes, a common approach is to
construct residual signals, especially for fault detection [18],
where a threshold based on the residual signal is used to dis-
tinguish between consistent and inconsistent modes. Using
this idea, [19] presents a robust control inspired resilient state
estimator for models with bounded-norm noise that consists
of local estimators, residual detectors and a global fusion
detector. However, in their setting, only sensors are attacked,
while the existence of the observers are assumed with no
observer design approach nor performance guarantees.
Contributions. The goal of this paper is to simultaneously
consider state and unknown input estimation as well as mode
detection for hidden mode switched linear systems with
bounded-norm noise and unknown inputs. To address this,
we propose a multiple-model approach that leverages the
optimally designed set-valued state and input H∞ observers
in our previous work [16] to obtain a bank of mode-
matched set-valued observers in combination with a novel
mode observer based on elimination. Our mode elimination
approach uses the upper bound of the norm of to-be-designed
residual signals to remove inconsistent modes from the bank
of observers. In particular, we provide a tractable method to
calculate an upper bound signal for the residual’s norm and
prove that the upper bound signal is a convergent sequence.
Moreover, we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee that
all false modes will be eventually eliminated.
Notation. Rn denotes the n-dimensional Euclidean space
and N nonnegative integers. For a vector v ∈ Rn and a matrix
M ∈ Rp×q , ‖v‖2 ,
√
v⊤v, ‖v‖∞ , max
1≤i≤n
vi and ‖M‖2 and
σmin(M) denote their induced 2-norm and non-trivial least
singular value, respectively.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a hidden mode switched linear system with
bounded-norm noise and unknown inputs (i.e., a hybrid
system with linear and noisy system dynamics in each mode,
and the mode and some inputs are not known/measured):
xk+1= Axk+Bu
q
k+G
qdqk+wk,
yk = Cxk+Du
q
k+H
qdqk+vk,
(1)
where xk ∈ Rn is the continuous system state and q ∈ Q =
{1, 2, . . . , Q} is the hidden discrete state or mode. For each
(fixed) mode q, uqk ∈ U qk ⊂ Rm is the known input, dqk ∈ Rp
the unknown but sparse input or attack signal, i.e., every
vector dqk has precisely ρ ∈ N nonzero elements where ρ is
a known parameter, yk ∈ Rl is the output, whereas wk ∈ Rn
and vk ∈ Rl are process and measurement 2-norm bounded
disturbances with known parameters ηw and ηv as their 2-
norm bounds respectively. The matrices A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈
Rn×m, Gq ∈ Rn×p, C ∈ Rl×n, D ∈ Rl×m and Hq ∈ Rl×p
are known and no prior ‘useful’ knowledge or assumption
of the dynamics of dqk, except sparsity is assumed.
More precisely, Gq and Hq represent the different hy-
pothesis for each mode q ∈ Q, about the sparsity pattern of
the unknown inputs, which in the context of sparse attacks
corresponds to which actuators and sensors are attacked or
not attacked. In other words, we assume that Gq = GIqG and
Hq = HIqH for some input matrices G ∈ Rn×ta and H ∈
Rl×ts , where ta and ts are the number of vulnerable actuator
and sensor signals respectively. Note that ρqa ≤ ta ≤ m and
ρqs ≤ ts ≤ l, where ρqa (ρqs) is the number of attacked actuator
(sensor) signals and clearly cannot exceed the number of
vulnerable actuator (sensor) signals, which in turn cannot
exceed the total number of actuators (sensors). Furthermore,
we assume that the total number of unknown inputs/attacks
in each mode is known and equals ρ = ρa + ρs (sparsity
assumption). Moreover, the index matrix I
q
G ∈ Rta×ρ (IqH ∈
Rts×ρ) represents the sub-vector of dk ∈ Rρ that indicates
signal magnitude attacks on the actuators (sensors).
Note that the approach in our paper can be easily extended
to handle mode-dependent A, B, C, D, wk , vk, ηw and ηv
but is omitted to simplify the notation. Moreover, throughout
the paper, we assume, without loss of generality, that for
each possible mode q, the system (A,Gq , C,Hq) is strongly
detectable [16, Definition 1], since this is a necessary and
sufficient condition for obtaining meaningful set-valued state
and input estimates when the mode is known.
Using the modeling framework above, the simultaneous
state, unknown input and hidden mode estimation problem
is threefold and can be stated as follows:
Problem 1. Given a switched linear hidden mode discrete-
time bounded-error system with unknown inputs (1),
1) Design a bank of mode-matched observers that for each
mode optimally finds the set estimates of compatible
states and unknown inputs in the minimum H∞-norm
sense, i.e., with minimum average power amplification,
conditional on the mode being true.
2) Develop a mode observer via elimination and the corre-
sponding criterion to eliminate false modes.
3) Find sufficient conditions for eliminating all false modes.
III. PROPOSED OBSERVER DESIGN
In this section, we propose a multiple-model approach for
simultaneous mode, state and unknown input estimation for
(1), where the goal of the observer is to find compatible set
estimates Dˆk, Xˆk and Qˆk for unknown inputs, states and
modes at time step k, respectively.
A. Overview of Multiple-Model Approach
The multiple-model design approach consists of three
components: (i) designing a bank of mode-matched set-
valued observers, (ii) designing a mode observer for elimi-
nating incompatible modes using residual detectors, and (iii)
a global fusion observer that outputs the desired set-valued
mode, input and state estimates.
1) Mode-Matched Set-Valued Observer: First, we design
a bank of mode-matched observers, which consists of Q
simultaneous state and input H∞ set-valued observers based
on the optimal fixed-order observer design in [16], which
we briefly summarize here. For each mode-matched observer
corresponding to mode q, following the approach in [16,
Section 3.1], we consider set-valued fixed-order estimates
of the form:
Dˆqk−1 = {dk−1 ∈ Rp : ‖dk−1 − dˆqk−1‖ ≤ δd,qk−1}, (2)
Xˆqk = {xk ∈ Rn : ‖xk − xˆqk|k‖ ≤ δx,qk }, (3)
where their centroids are obtained with the following three-
step recursive observer that is optimal in H∞-norm sense:
Unknown Input Estimation:
dˆq1,k= M
q
1 (z
q
1,k − Cq1 xˆqk|k −Dq1uqk)
dˆq2,k−1= M
q
2 (z
q
2,k − Cq2 xˆqk|k−1 −Dq2uqk)
dˆqk−1= V
q
1 dˆ
q
1,k−1 + V
q
2 dˆ
q
2,k−1
(4)
Time Update:
xˆq
k|k−1 = Axˆ
q
k−1|k−1 +Bu
q
k−1 +G
q
1dˆ
q
1,k−1
xˆ⋆,q
k|k = xˆ
q
k|k−1 +G
q
2dˆ
q
2,k−1
(5)
Measurement Update:
xˆq
k|k = xˆ
⋆,q
k|k + L˜
q(zq2,k − Cq2 xˆ⋆,qk|k −Dq2uqk) (6)
where L˜q ∈ Rn×(l−pHq ), M q1 ∈ RpHq×pHq and M q2 ∈
R(p−pHq )×(l−pHq ) are observer gain matrices that are chosen
in the following theorem from [16] to minimize the “volume”
of the set of compatible states and unknown inputs, quantified
by the radii δd,qk−1 and δ
x,q
k .
Theorem 1. [16, Lemma 2 & Theorem 4] Suppose the
system (A,Gq , C,Hq) is strongly detectable,M q1Σ
q = I and
M q2C
q
2G
q
2 = I . Then, for each mode q, there exists a stable
and optimal (in H∞-norm sense) observer with gain L˜q,
where the input and state estimation errors, d˜qk−1 , d
q
k−1−
dˆqk−1 and x˜
q
k|k , xk − xˆqk|k , are bounded for all k (i.e., the
set-valued estimates are bounded with radii δd,qk−1, δ
x,q
k <∞),
and the observer gains and the set estimates are given in [16,
Theorem 2 & Algorithm 1].
Algorithm 1 Simultaneous Mode, State and Input Estimation
1: Qˆ0 = Q;
2: for k = 1 to N do
3: for q ∈ Qˆk−1 do
⊲ Mode-Matched State and Input Set-Valued Estimates
Compute T
q
2 ,M
q
1 ,M
q
2 , L˜
q , xˆ
⋆,q
k|k, Xˆ
q
k , Dˆ
q
k−1 via Theorem 1;
z
q
2,k = T
q
2 yk;
⊲ Mode Observer via Elimination
Qˆk = Qˆk−1;
Compute r
q
k via Definition 1 and δˆ
q
r,k via Theorem 3;
4: if ‖rqk‖2 > δˆ
q
r,k then Qˆk = Qˆk\{q};
5: end if
6: end for
⊲ State and Input Estimates
7: Xˆk = ∪q∈QˆkXˆ
q
k ; Dˆk = ∪q∈QˆkDˆ
q
k;
8: end for
2) Mode Estimation Observer: To estimate the set of
compatible modes, we consider an elimination approach that
compares residual signals against some thresholds. Specifi-
cally, we will eliminate a specific mode q, if ‖rqk‖2 > δˆqr,k,
where the residual signal rqk is defined as follows and the
thresholds δˆqr,k will be derived in Section III-B.
Definition 1 (Residuals). For each mode q at time step k,
the residual signal is defined as:
rqk , z
q
2,k − Cq2 xˆ⋆,qk|k −Dq2uqk.
3) Global Fusion Observer: Then, combining the outputs
of both components above, our proposed global fusion ob-
server will provide mode, unknown input and state set-valued
estimates at each time step k as:
Qˆk = {q ∈ Q ‖rqk‖2 ≤ δˆqr,k},
Dˆk−1 = ∪q∈QˆkD
q
k−1, Xˆk = ∪q∈QˆkX
q
k .
The multiple-model approach is summarized in Algorithm 1.
B. Mode Elimination Approach
The idea is simple. If the residual signal of a particular
mode exceeds its upper bound conditioned on this mode
being true, we can conclusively rule it out as incompatible.
To do so, for each mode q, we first compute an upper bound
(δˆqr,k) for the 2-norm of its corresponding residual at time
k, conditioned on q being the true mode. Then, comparing
the 2-norm of residual signal in Definition 1 with δˆqr,k, we
can eliminate mode q if the residual’s 2-norm is strictly
greater than the upper bound. This can be formalized using
the following proposition and theorem.
Proposition 1. Consider mode q at time step k, its residual
signal rqk (as defined in Definition 1) and the unknown true
mode q∗. Then,
r
q
k = r
q|∗
k +∆r
q|q∗
k , where
r
q|∗
k , z
q∗
2,k − C
q
2 xˆ
⋆,q
k|k −D
q
2u
q
k = T
q∗
2 yk − C
q
2 xˆ
⋆,q
k|k −D
q
2u
q
k,
∆r
q|q∗
k , (T
q
2 − T
q∗
2 )yk,
where r
q|∗
k is the true mode’s residual signal (i.e., q = q
∗),
and ∆r
q|q∗
k is the residual error.
Proof. This follows directly from plugging the above expres-
sions into the right hand side term of Definition 1. 
Theorem 2. Consider mode q and its residual signal rqk
at time step k. Assume that δq,∗r,k is any signal that satisfies
‖rq|∗k ‖2 ≤ δq,∗r,k , where rq|∗k is defined in Proposition 1. Then,
mode q is not the true mode, i.e., can be eliminated at time
k, if ‖rqk‖2 > δq,∗r,k .
Proof. To use contradiction, suppose q is the true mode. By
uniqueness of the true mode q = q∗, so T q2 = T
q∗
2 and by
Proposition 1, ∆r
q|q∗
k = 0 and hence ‖rqk‖2 = ‖rq|∗k ‖2 ≤
δq,∗r,k , which contradicts with the assumption. 
C. Tractable Computation of Thresholds
Theorem 2 provides a sufficient condition for mode elim-
ination at each time step. To apply this sufficient condition,
we need to compute an upper bound for ‖rq|∗k ‖2, i.e., our
δq,∗r,k signal (cf. Theorem 3) and show that it is bounded in
the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. Consider any mode q with the unknown true
mode being q∗. Then, at time step k, we have
r
q|∗
k = C
q
2 x˜
⋆,q
k|k + v
q
2,k = A
q
ktk, (7)
where tk,
[
x˜⊤0|0 w
⊤
0 . . . w
⊤
k−1 v
⊤
0 . . . v
⊤
k
]⊤
∈ R(n+l)(k+1),
A
q
k ,[C
q
2A
q
A
q
e
k−1
C
q
2A
q
A
q
e
k−2
B
q
e,wC
q
2A
q
A
q
e
k−2
B
q
e,w . . .
C
q
2A
q
A
q
e
k−1−i
B
q
e,w . . . C
q
2A
q
A
q
eB
q
e,wC
q
2B
⋆,q
e,w
C
q
2A
q
A
q
e
k−2
B
q
e,v1
C
q
2A
q
A
q
e
k−2(Bqe,v1 + A
q
eB
q
e,v2
) . . .
C
q
2A
q
A
q
e
k−1−i(Bqe,v1 + A
q
eB
q
e,v2
) . . .
C
q
2A
q
A
q
e(B
q
e,v1
+ AqeB
q
e,v2
)Cq2(B
q,⋆
e,v1
+A
q
B
q
e,v2
)
C
q
2B
q,⋆
e,v2
+ T q2 ] ∈ R
(l−pHq )×(n+l)(k+1),
with A
q
, (I − Gq2M
q
2C
q
2)(A − G
q
1M
q
1C
q
1), A
q
e ,
(I − L˜qCq2 )A
q
, B⋆,qe,w , (I − G
q
2M
q
2C
q
2), B
⋆,q
e,v1 , −(I −
G
q
2M
q
2C
q
2 )(G
q
1M
q
1T
q
1 ), B
q
e,w , (I − L˜
qC
q
2)B
⋆,q
e,w , B
q
e,v1 ,
(I−L˜qCq2 )B
⋆,q
e,v1 and B
q
e,v2 , (I−L˜
qC
q
2 )B
⋆,q
e,v2−L˜
qT
q
2 , B
⋆,q
e,v2 ,
−Gq2M
q
2T
q
2 .
Proof. Considering (7), the first equality comes from Defini-
tion 1 and zq2,k = C
q
2xk+D
q
2,ku
q
k+v
q
2,k from [16], assuming
that q is the true mode, and the second equality is implied
by the first equality and the fact in [16, Appendix C] that
x˜⋆,q
k|k = A
q
Aqe
k−1x˜0|0 +A
q
Aqe
k−2
[
Bqe,wB
q
e,v1
]
~w0
+B⋆,qe,wwk−1 + (B
⋆,q
e,v1 +A
q
Bqe,v2)vk−1 +B
⋆,q
e,v2vk
+
∑k−2
i=1 A
q
Aqe
k−1−i
[
Bqe,w B
q
e,v1 +A
q
eB
q
e,v2
]
~wi,
~wk ,
[
w⊤k v
⊤
k
]⊤
. 
Lemma 2. For each mode q at time step k, there exists a
generic finite valued upper bound δqr,k <∞ for ‖rq|∗k ‖2.
Proof. Consider the following optimization problem for
‖rq|∗k ‖2 by leveraging Lemma 1:
δqr,k , maxtk
‖Aqktk‖2 (8)
s.t. tk =
[
x˜⊤0|0 w
⊤
0 . . . w
⊤
k−1 v
⊤
0 . . . v
⊤
k
]⊤
,
‖x˜0|0‖2 ≤ δx0 , ‖wi‖2 ≤ ηw, ‖vj‖2 ≤ ηv,
i ∈ {0, ..., k − 1}, j ∈ {0, ..., k}.
The objective 2-norm function is continuous and the con-
straint set is an intersection of level sets of lower dimensional
norm functions, which is closed and bounded, so is compact.
Hence, by Weierstrass Theorem [20, Proposition 2.1.1], the
objective function attains its maxima on the constraint set
and so a finite-valued upper bound exists. 
Clearly δqr,k in Lemma 2 is the tightest possible residual
norm’s upper bound and potentially can eliminate the most
possible number of modes, so is the best choice if we
can calculate it. But, notice that although it was straight
forward to show that a finite-valued δqr,k exists, but since
the optimization problem in Lemma 2 is a norm maximiza-
tion (not minimization) over the intersection of level sets
of lower dimensional norm functions, i.e., a non-concave
maximization over intersection of quadratic constraints, it
is an NP-hard problem [21]. To tackle with this complexity,
we provide an over-approximation for δqr,k in the following
Theorem 3, which we call δˆqr,k.
Theorem 3. Consider mode q. At time step k, let
δˆ
q
r,k , min{δ
q,inf
r,k , δ
q,tri
r,k },
δ
q,inf
r,k , ‖A
q
kt
⋆
k‖2,
δ
q,tri
r,k , δ
x,q
0 ‖C
q
2A
q
A
q
e
k−1‖2 + ηw‖C
q
2A
q
A
q
e
k−2‖2+∑k−2
i=1 [ηw‖C
q
2A
q
Aqe
iBqe,w‖2+ηv‖C
q
2A
q
Aqe
i(Bqe,v1+A
q
eB
q
e,v2
)‖2]
+ ηv(‖C
q
2A
q
A
q
e
k−2
B
q
e,v1
‖2 + ‖C
q
2 (B
q,⋆
e,v1
+ A
q
B
q
e,v2
)‖2)
+ ‖Cq2B
q,⋆
e,v2
+ T q2 ‖2) + ηw‖C
q
2B
⋆,q
e,w‖2,
where t⋆k is a vertex of the following hypercube:
X qk ,
{
x ∈ R(n+l)(k+1)
|x(i)| ≤


δx0 , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
ηw, n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n(k + 1)
ηv, n(k + 1) + 1 ≤ i ≤ (n+ l)(k + 1)
}
,
i.e.,
t⋆k(i) ∈


{−δx0 , δx0}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
{−ηw, ηw}, n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n(k + 1),
{−ηv, ηv}, n(k + 1) + 1 ≤ i ≤ (n+ l)(k + 1).
Then, δˆqr,k is an over-approximation for δ
q
r,k in Lemma 2.
Proof. Consider the optimization problem
δq,infr,k , maxtk
‖Aqktk‖2 (9)
s.t. tk =
[
x˜⊤0|0 w
⊤
0 . . . w
⊤
k−1 v
⊤
0 . . . v
⊤
k
]
,
‖x˜0|0‖∞ ≤ δx0 , ‖wi‖∞ ≤ ηw, ‖vj‖∞ ≤ ηv,
∀i ∈ {0, ..., k − 1}, ∀j ∈ {0, ..., k}.
Comparing (8) and (9), the two problems have the same
objective functions, while since ‖.‖∞ ≤ ‖.‖2, the constraint
set for (8) is a subset of the one for (9). Hence δqr,k ≤
δq,infr,k . Also, it is easy to see that δˆ
q
r,k ≤ δq,trir,k , using
triangle and sub-multiplicative inequalities. Moreover, (9) is
a maximization of a convex objective function over a convex
constraint (hypercubeX qk ). By a famous result [22, Corollary
32.2.1], in such a problem, the objective function attains its
maxima on some of the extreme points of the constraint set,
which in this case are the vertices of the hypercube X qk . 
It can be easily seen as a corollary of Theorem 3 that:
Corollary 1. ηtk , ‖t⋆k‖2 =
√
nδxo
2 + knη2w + (k + 1)lη
2
v .
Theorem 3 enables us to obtain an upper bound for
‖rq|∗k ‖2, by enumerating the objective function in (9) at
vertices of the hypercube X qk and choosing the largest value
as δq,infr,k . Moreover, we can easily calculate δ
q,tri
r,k ; then, the
upper bound is chosen as the minimum of the two as δˆqr,k.
Remark 1. Although simulation results indicate that espe-
cially in earlier time steps, δq,infr,k may have smaller values
than δq,trir,k , but if we only consider δ
q,inf
r,k as the over-
approximation and do not use δq,trir,k , then we will face two
difficulties. First, as time increases, the number of required
enumerations (i.e., the number of hypercube’s vertices which
is 2(n+l)(k+1)) increases with an exponential rate. Second
and more importantly, as Lemma 3 will indicate later, δq,infr,k
goes to infinity as time increases, so it will be unlikely
to eliminate any mode when the time step is large, i.e.,
asymptotically speaking, δq,infr,k will be useless. In contrast,
again by Lemma 3, δq,trir,k converges to some steady-state
value, so it can be always used as an over-approximation
for δqr,k in the mode elimination process.
IV. MODE DETECTABILITY
In addition to the nice properties regarding the stability and
boundedness of the mode-matched set estimates of state and
input obtained from [16], we now provide some sufficient
conditions for the system dynamics, which guarantee that
regardless of the observations, after some large enough time
steps, all the false (i.e., not true) modes can be eliminated,
when applying Algorithm 1. To do so, first, we define the
concept of mode detectability as well as some assumptions
for deriving our sufficient conditions for mode detectability.
Definition 2 (Mode Detectability). System (1) is called mode
detectable if there exists a natural number K > 0, such that
for all time steps k ≥ K , all false modes are eliminated.
Assumption 1. There exist known Ry, Rx ∈ R such that
∀k, yk ∈ Y , {y ∈ Rl ‖y‖2 ≤ Ry} and xk ∈ X , {x ∈
Rn ‖x‖2 ≤ Rx}, i.e., there exist known bounds for the whole
observation/measurement and state spaces, respectively.
Assumption 2. The unknown input/attack signal has an
unlimited energy, i.e., limk→∞ ‖dq∗0:k‖2 = ∞, where dq∗0:k ,[
dq∗⊤k d
q∗⊤
k−1 . . . d
q∗⊤
0
]⊤
.
Note that Assumption 2 is not restrictive because other-
wise, the unknown input/attack signal must vanish asymp-
totically, which means that the true mode (with no unknown
inputs) can be inferred asymptotically.
In order to derive the desired sufficient conditions for
mode detectability in Theorem 4, we first present the fol-
lowing Lemmas 3–5. For the sake of clarity, the proofs of
these results are given in the Appendix.
Lemma 3. For each mode q,
lim
k→∞
δq,infr,k =∞. (10)
lim
k→∞
δˆqr,k = lim
k→∞
δq,trir,k ≤ lim
k→∞
δ
q,tri
r,k = δ
q,tri
r <∞, (11)
where δ
q,tri
r,k , δ
x,q
0 ‖Cq2A
q
Aqe
k−1‖2 + ηw‖Cq2A
q
Aqe
k−2‖2 +
ηw[‖Cq2A
q
Aqe‖2‖Bqe,w‖2
∑k−3
i=0 (‖Aqe‖i2) + ‖Cq2B⋆,qe,w‖2] +
ηv[‖Cq2A
q
Aqe‖2‖Bqe,v1 + AqeBqe,v2‖2
∑k−3
i=0 ‖Aqe‖i2] +
ηv[‖Cq2Bq,⋆e,v2 + T q2 ‖2 + ‖Cq2 (Bq,⋆e,v1 + A
q
Bqe,v2)‖2] +
ηv‖Cq2A
q
Aqe
k−2Bqe,v1‖2, δ
q,tri
r , ηw[‖Cq2Bq,⋆e,w‖2 +
‖Cq2A
q
Aqe‖2/(1−θq)+‖Bqe,w‖2]+ηv[‖Bqe,v1 +AqeBqe,v2‖2+
‖Cq2Bq,⋆e,v2 + T q2 ‖2 + ‖Cq2 (Bq,⋆e,v1 + A
q
Bqe,v2)‖2] and
θq , ‖Aqe‖2, with A
q
, Aqe, B
q
e,w, B
q,⋆
e,w, B
q
e,v1
, Bq,⋆e,v1 , B
q
e,v2
and Bq,⋆e,v2 given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Consider two
different modes q 6= q′ ∈ Q and their corresponding upper
bounds for their residuals’ norms, δqr,k and δ
q′
r,k, at time step
k. At least one of the two modes q 6= q′ will be eliminated if
‖Cq2 xˆ
⋆,q
k|k − C
q′
2 xˆ
⋆,q′
k|k+D
q
2u
q
k −D
q′
2 u
q′
k ‖2>δ
q
r,k+δ
q′
r,k+R
q,q′
z (12)
where Rq,q
′
z , Ry‖T q2 − T q
′
2 ‖2.
Lemma 5. Consider any mode q with the unknown true
mode being q∗. Then, at time step k, we have
rqk =
[
T
q,q∗
k B
q,q∗
k D
q,q∗
k
] [
t⊤k u
q∗⊤
0:k d
q∗⊤
0:k
]⊤
,
where uq
∗
0:k ,
[
uq∗⊤k u
q∗⊤
k−1 . . . u
q∗⊤
0
]⊤
,
T
q,q∗
k , (T
q∗
2 − T
q
2 )
[
CAk CAk−1 . . . C I
]
+ Aqk,
B
q,q∗
k , (T
q∗
2 − T
q
2 )
[
D CB CAB . . . CAk−1B
]
,
D
q,q∗
k , (T
q∗
2 − T
q
2 )
[
H CG CAG . . . CAk−1G
]
,
with tk given in Lemma 1 and d
q∗
0:k in Assumption 2.
Theorem 4 (Sufficient Conditions for Mode Detectability).
System (1) is mode detectable, i.e., all false modes will
be eliminated after some large enough time step K , using
Algorithm 1, if the assumptions in Theorem 1 and either of
the following hold:
i) Assumption 1 and ∀q, q′ ∈ Q, q 6= q′,
σmin(W
q,q′) >
δ
q,tri
r + δ
q′,tri
r +R
′q,q′
y√
R2x + η
2
v
;
ii) Assumption 2 and T q2 6= T q
′
2 holds ∀q, q′ ∈ Q, q 6= q′,
where W q,q
′
,
[
(Cq2 − Cq
′
2 ) (T
q
2 − T q
′
2 ) −I I Dq2 −Dq
′
2
]
.
V. SIMULATION EXAMPLE
We consider a system that has been used as a benchmark
for many state and input filters/observers (e.g., [6]):
A =


0.5 2 0 0 0
0 0.2 1 0 1
0 0 0.3 0 1
0 0 0 0.7 1
0 0 0 0 0.1

;G =


1
0.1
0.1
1
0

;H =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0

;
B = 05×1;C = I5;D = 05×1.
The unknown inputs used in this example are as given in
Figure 2, while the initial state estimate and noise signals
have bounds δx = 0.5, ηw = 0.02 and ηv = 10
−4. We
assume possible attacks on the actuator and four of five
sensors, i.e., ta = 1 and ts = 4. Moreover, we assume
that there are ρ = 4 attacks, so we should consider Q =(
5
4
)
= 5 modes. Table I indicates different modes, their attack
location(s) and the matrix T q2 for each mode q, where, as
can be observed, the second set of sufficient conditions in
Theorem 4 holds, i.e., T q2 6= T q
′
2 for all q 6= q′, so we expect
that after some large enough time, all the false modes be
eliminated, i.e., at most one (true) mode remains at each time
step, which can be seen in Figure 1, where the number of
eliminated modes at each time step is exhibited. Moreover,
for each specific mode q, the signals ‖rqk‖2, ‖rq|∗k ‖2, δq,trir,k
and δq,infr,k are depicted in Figure 1. As can be seen, up
to some large enough time, at different time intervals for
different modes, one of the upper bounds may be tighter than
the other, or vice-versa, so it is reasonable that we consider a
minimum of them as the computed upper bound in our mode
elimination algorithm. Furthermore, for all modes, δq,trir,k is
eventually convergent while δq,infr,k diverges, as we proved in
TABLE I: Different modes and their T q2 .
Mode Attack location(s) T q
2
q = 1 Actuator & Sensors 1,2,3 [0.2518 -0.1068 -0.2409 -0.5862 0.7236]⊤
q = 2 Actuator & Sensors 1,2,4 [0.0080 0.7604 -0.1522 -0.5862 -0.6313]⊤
q = 3 Actuator & Sensors 1,3,4 [-0.5357 0.7289 0.1984 -0.3774 0.0009]⊤
q = 4 Actuator & Sensors 2,3,4 [0.7092 -0.5570 -0.1797 -0.3295 0.2143]⊤
q = 5 Sensors 1,2,3,4 [0.1679 -0.5682 0.5198 -0.4883 0.3747]⊤
Fig. 1: ‖rqr,k‖2,‖rq|∗r,k‖2 and their upper bounds for different
modes, as well as the number of eliminated modes in time
Fig. 2: State and unknown input set-valued estimates.
Lemma 3. So, after some large enough time, δq,trir,k can be
used as our upper-bound, while δq,infr,k becomes useless. The
corresponding set-valued estimates are provided in Figure 2.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a residual-based approach for hidden mode
switched linear systems with bounded-norm noise and un-
known attack signals. The proposed approach at each time
step, removes the inconsistent modes and their corresponding
observers from a bank of estimators, which includes mode-
matched observers. Each mode-matched observer, condi-
tioned on its corresponding mode being true, simultaneously
finds bounded sets of states and unknown inputs that include
the true state and inputs. Our mode elimination criterion
required a bounded upper bound for the residual’s norm,
for which we proved its existence and computed it by over-
approximating the value function of a non-concave NP-hard
norm-maximization problem by expanding its constraint set
and converting it into a convex maximization over a convex
set with finite number of extreme points. Such a problem
can be solved by enumerating the objective function on
the extreme points of the constraint set and comparing the
corresponding values. Moreover, we proved the convergence
of the upper bound signal and derived sufficient conditions
for eventually eliminating all false modes using our mode
elimination algorithm. Finally, we demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of our observer using an illustrative example.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 3. To show (10), we first find a lower
bound for δq,infr,k . Then, we show that the lower bound
diverges and so does δq,infr,k . Define t˜
⋆
k , t
⋆
k/η
t
k, where η
t
k is
defined in Corollary 1. Now consider
ηtkσmin(A
q
k) = σmin(η
t
kA
q
k) = min
‖t‖2≤1
‖ηtkAqkt‖2
≤ ‖ηtkAqk t˜⋆k‖2 = ‖Aqkt⋆k‖2 = δq,infr,k ,
where σmin(A) is the least non-trivial singular value of
matrix A, the first equality holds since σmin(.) is a linear
operator, the second equality is a special case of a matrix
lower bound [23] when 2-norms are considered, the inequal-
ity holds since ‖t˜⋆k‖2 = 1 by Corollary 1, so t˜⋆k is a feasible
point for the minimization in the third statement and the
last equality holds by Theorem 3. So far we have shown
that ηtkσmin(A
q
k) is a lower bound for δ
q,inf
r,k . Next, we will
prove that ηtkσmin(A
q
k) is unbounded. First, it is trivial that
ηtk is unbounded by its definition in Corollary 1. Second,
consider the block matrix A
q
k in Lemma 1. By the strong
detectability assumption, matrix Aqe is stable [16, Theorem
3 and Appendix C], so all the block matrices of A
q
k, except
three of them which are constant matrices with respect to
time, converge to zero matrices when time goes to infinity.
Hence A
q
k converges to an infinite dimensional sparse matrix,
with only three non-zero finite dimensional constant blocks
and so the limit matrix has a finite rank and clearly has
a bounded minimum non-trivial singular value. Henceforth,
ηtkσmin(A
q
k) is unbounded, since the product of the bounded
and non-zero σmin(A
q
k) and unbounded η
t
k is unbounded.
As for (11), the first equality holds by definition of δˆqr,k
(cf. Theorem 3) and (10), the first inequality holds since
δq,trir,k ≤ δ
q,r
r,k by triangle and sub-multiplicative inequalities
and the last equality, i.e., convergence of δq,trir,k , follows from
strong detectability assumption which implies the stability of
Aqe [16, Theorem 3]. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose, for contradiction, that none of
q and q′ are eliminated. Then
‖Cq2 xˆ
⋆,q
k|k +D
q
2u
q
k − C
q′
2 xˆ
⋆,q′
k|k −D
q′
2 u
q′
k ‖2 =
‖rq
′
k − r
q
k + z
q
2,k − z
q′
2,k)‖2 ≤ ‖r
q′
k ‖2 + ‖r
q
k‖2 + ‖z
q
2,k − z
q′
2,k‖2
≤ δqr,k + δ
q′
r,k +Ry‖T
q
2 − T
q′
2 ‖2,
where the equality holds by Definition 1, the first inequality
holds by triangle inequality and the last inequality holds by
the assumption that none of q and q′ can be eliminated, as
well as the boundedness assumption for the measurement
space. This last inequality contradicts with the inequality in
the lemma, thus the result holds. 
Proof of Lemma 5. The result can be obtained by applying
Proposition 1, (7) and the closed-form output signal:
yk =




(CAk)⊤
(CAk−1)⊤
.
.
.
C⊤
I


⊤ 

H⊤
(CG)⊤
(CAG)⊤
.
.
.
(CAk−1G)⊤


⊤ 

D⊤
(CB)⊤
(CAB)⊤
.
.
.
(CAk−1B)⊤


⊤



tk
d
q∗
0:k
u
q∗
0:k

 ,
which can be derived by using (1) and simple induction. 
Proof of Theorem 4. To show that (i) is sufficient for asymp-
totic mode detectability, consider Lemma 4 with δq,trir,k as the
upper bound. It suffices to show ∃K ∈ N, such that (12)
holds for k ≥ K, ∀q 6= q′ ∈ Q. Notice that by Definition 1,
Cq2 xˆ
⋆,q
k|k = C
q
2xk + T
q
2 vk − rq|∗k . Plugging this into (12), we
need to show ∃K ∈ N such that:
‖W q,q
′
s
q,q′
k ‖2 > δ
q,tri
r,k + δ
q′,tri
r,k +R
q,q′
z ,∀k ≥ K, (13)
s
q,q′
k ,
[
x⊤k v
⊤
k r
q|∗⊤
k r
q′|∗⊤
k u
q⊤
k u
q′⊤
k
]⊤
,∀q 6= q′ ∈ Q.
A sufficient condition to satisfy (13) is that ∃K ∈ N such
that ∀k ≥ K , (13) holds for all sq,q′k . Equivalently, it suffices
min
xk,vk,r
q
k
,r
q′
k
‖W q,q′sq,q′k ‖2 > δq,trir,k + δq
′,tri
r,k +R
q,q′
z
s.t. ‖xk‖2 ≤ Rx, ‖vk‖2 ≤ ηv, ‖rq|∗k ‖2 ≤ δq,trir,k ,
‖rq′|∗k ‖2 ≤ δq
′,tri
r,k , ∀k ≥ K, ∀q 6= q′ ∈ Q.
By expanding the constraint set, it is sufficient to require that
∃K ∈ N such that:
min
s
q,q′
k
‖W q,q′sq,q′k ‖2 > δq,trir,k + δq
′,tri
r,k +R
q,q′
z
s.t. ‖sq,q′k ‖22 ≤ R2x+η2v+(δq,trir,k )2+(δq
′,tri
r,k )
2 + (uqk)
2 + (uq
′
k )
2
∀k ≥ K, ∀q 6= q′ ∈ Q.
Now, by matrix lower bound theorem [23] and similar
argument as in the proof of Lemma 3, it is sufficient to be
satisfied that ∃K ∈ N s.t. ∀k ≥ K, ∀q 6= q′ ∈ Q :
σ2min(W
q,q′ )>
(δq,tri
r,k
+ δq
′ ,tri
r,k
+ Rq,q
′
z )
2
R2x+η
2
v+(δ
q,tri
r,k
)2+(δq
′ ,tri
r,k
)2+(uq
k
)2+(uq
′
k
)2
. (14)
(14) provides us a time-dependent sufficient condition
for mode detectability. In order to find a time-independent
sufficient condition, notice that
(δ
q,tri
r,k +δ
q′,tri
r,k +R
q,q′
z )
2
R2x+η
2
v
is an
upper bound for the right hand side of (14), since the latter’s
denominator is smaller than the former’s and the numerator
of the latter is an upper bound signal for the former’s by
triangle and sub-multiplicative inequalities. So a sufficient
condition for (14) is ∃K ∈ N s.t. ∀k ≥ K, ∀q 6= q′ ∈ Q :
σ2min(W
q,q′ ) >
(δ
q,tri
r,k + δ
q′,tri
r,k +R
q,q′
z )
2
R2x + η
2
v
. (15)
Then, for the above to hold, it suffices that
σ2min(W
q,q′) > lim
k→∞
(δ
q,tri
r,k + δ
q′,tri
r,k +R
q,q′
z )
2
R2x + η
2
v
,
which is equivalent to (i) by (11). As for the sufficiency
of (ii), notice that by Theorems 2 and 3, Lemma 1 and
Definition 2, for mode detectability, it suffices that for any
specific mode q, the true mode q∗ and large enough k,
‖rqk‖2 = ‖
[
T
q,q∗
k B
q,q∗
k D
q,q∗
k
] [
t⊤k u
q∗⊤
0:k d
q∗⊤
0:k
]⊤
‖2 > δ
q,tri
r,k ,
with tk given in (9). Since q
∗ is unknown, a sufficient
condition to satisfy the above equality is ∀q′ 6= q ∈ Q :
‖rqk‖2 = ‖
[
T
q,q′
k B
q,q′
k D
q,q′
k
] [
t⊤k u
q′⊤
0:k d
q∗⊤
0:k
]⊤
‖2 > δq,trir,k .
So it suffices that ∀q′ 6= q ∈ Q, ∃d ∈ R, such that:
min
t′
k
‖
[
T
q,q′
k B
q,q′
k D
q,q′
k
]
t′k‖2 > δq,trir,k
s.t. t′k =
[
t⊤k u
q′⊤
0:k d
q∗⊤
0:k
]⊤
, ‖dq∗0:k‖2 ≥ d,
tk =
[
x˜⊤0|0 w
⊤
0 . . . w
⊤
k−1 v
⊤
0 . . . v
⊤
k
]
,
‖x˜0|0‖∞ ≤ δx0 , ‖wi‖∞ ≤ ηw, ‖vj‖∞ ≤ ηv,
∀i ∈ {0, ..., k − 1}, ∀j ∈ {0, ..., k}.
Again by matrix lower bound theorem, a sufficient condition
for the above inequality to hold is that ∃d ∈ R, such that:
min
tk,d0:k
‖t′k‖2 >
δq,trir,k
σmin
[
T
q,q′
k B
q,q′
k D
q,q′
k
] (16)
s.t. t′k =
[
t⊤k u
q′⊤
0:k d
q∗⊤
0:k
]⊤
, ‖dq∗0:k‖2 ≥ d,
tk =
[
x˜⊤0|0 w
⊤
0 . . . w
⊤
k−1 v
⊤
0 . . . v
⊤
k
]
,
‖x˜0|0‖∞ ≤ δx0 , ‖wi‖∞ ≤ ηw, ‖vj‖∞ ≤ ηv,
∀i ∈ {0, ..., k − 1}, ∀j ∈ {0, ..., k}.
Finally, since δq,trir,k ≤ δ
q,tri
r,k and
‖t′k‖2 = ‖
[
t⊤
k
u
q′⊤
0:k d
q∗⊤
0:k
]
‖2 ≥
√
02 + 02 + ‖dq∗⊤0:k ‖
2
2 = ‖d
q∗⊤
0:k ‖2,
then a sufficient condition for (16) is that
‖dq∗⊤0:k ‖2 >
δ
q,tri
r,k
σmin(
[
T
q,q′
k B
q,q′
k D
q,q′
k
]
)
. (17)
Now suppose that T q2 6= T q
′
2 (otherwise the matrix in the
denominator of (17) is zero and it never holds). Asymptoti-
cally speaking, the right hand side of (17) converges to δ˜ ,
max{0, (δq,trir /σq,q
′
)}, since δq,trir,k converges to δ
q,tri
r and
the least singular value in the denominator either diverges or
converges to some steady value σq,q
′
. So we set d equal to
any real number strictly grater than δ˜. By unlimited energy
assumption for attack signal, after some large enough time
step K , the monotone increasing function ‖dq∗0:k‖2, exceeds
d and so the system will be mode detectable. 
